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A. Manjunatha**
This paper aims at giving an insight into the financial analysis of the independent power projects in
India (IPP), under Government Power Policy, 1996. These projects are generally executed on BOOT
basis, wherein the IPPs build, own, operate and then transfer the project to statutory authorities. The
project appraisal using Net Present Value (NPV) method is attempted. This is followed by risk
analysis using Monte-Carlo simulation technique. Impact on NPV is studied using sensitivity
analysis, where one variable affecting NPV is varied at a time keeping all other parameters constant.
The result of this study indicates that based on power policy (1996),' the IPPs are financially viable.
The conclusions of the-paper will be useful to promoters planning to enter the power generation
industry. This is an exercise in valuation of an IPp, which will be useful even when mergers and
acquisitions in the inaustry teke place.
INTRODUCTION
In the infrastructure sector, power is one of the important
sectors for the development of an economy. According
to estimates of Central Electricity Authority (CEA), done
in 1996, in the next 15 years India needed additional
1,40,000 MW capacity which would cost about USD
120 billion (at 1996 prices) to achieve the targeted growth
of GDP. The government was not in a position to
earmark this huge outlay for one particular sector.
Besides, the public sector companies were not in a
position to either add the additional capacity with their
own resources, nor were they in a position to modernize
their generating abilities without additional infusion of
funds from government. In this scenario, the government
decided to open up the sector for private and
international participation to attract investments and
latest technology. These projects could be executed
either on BOO and/or BOOT basis depending upon the
agreements that are entered into between the
Government and the IPPs (see Box 1 for salient features
of Government Power Policy 1996) (Raghuram, Jain,
Sinha, Pangotra and Morris (2001).
Looking at the amount of capital commitment and high
expectations from private participation in this sector,
financial analysis in power projects becomes a
necessary exercise. One study by Esther Malini (1996)
pertains to investment analysis in transport
infrastructure project. Another study by Economic
Development Institute of World Bank attempts
investment risk evaluation in the context of co-
generation project. There has been no formal study on
financial analysis in power sector in the Indian context.
The present paper aims at evaluating the financial
viability of a power project under the 1996 power policy
guidelines.
Following are the specific objectives of this study:
• To appraise the power projects using net present
value and analyze the risk thereon using Monte
Carlo simulation technique.
• To analyze the impact on NPV by carrying out a
sensitivity analysis.
METHODOLOGY
Independent Power Project (IPP) is an entity
conceptualized over the period taking concrete form in
the year 1996 with the Government announcing the power
policy for IPPs. The study relies on data collected from
IPPs through survey. Based on the data thus collected,
a model power project with representative financial
statistics is considered for investment appraisal using
NPV method and simulation (see Box 2 and 3) in this
paper. 56% of the totallPPs are thermal projects. Hence,
we have considered a thermal IPP in this study.
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Survey
A detailed survey in two parts was conducted, which
facilitated procurement of data for variables considered
in the case study. One survey, on an all India basis,
through a detailed questionnaire elicited information on
different issues in IPP sector in India. The respondents,
nearly 20 in number, for this survey were basically the
existing power generating companies, both in the public
and private sector and those corporate entities who had
either set up or were in the process of setting up a
power project. This survey provided data for the
simulation exercise.
The second survey focused on getting data on the inputs
like interest rate, inflation, etc. for sensitivity analysis.
The respondents, nearly 10, for this survey were
academicians, economists, and experts in the power
industry.
Case Study
The power policy prescribed an assured rate of return
of 16% on the equity at a base level of 68.5% plant
load factor (PLF) achieved (Jain, 1998). For additional
PLF achieved, there is an incentive (see Box 4 for
details). Hence, the rate of
return (RoR) earned by an IPP is :
RoR = 16 + (PLF-68.5) * incentive factor
This is the assured rate of return on equity earned by
an IPP. All costs like interest on debt, depreciation,
taxes, foreign exchange fluctuations and all other
variable costs are a pass through to the consumers.
Hence, the annual net cash-inflows for an IPP will be
Rs. 200 crores * RoR (in %).
For the purpose of considering cash flows, the residual
value, based on the survey results, of the project is
considered as 5% of the total project cost and the same
is reckoned in the 25th year along with cash flow for
the 25th year.
In this study, we start with a model power project. The
initial investment is taken as Rs. 200.00 crores based
on the ideal debt-equity ratio for power projects, which
has been obtained from the survey. The basic project
statistics, the exogenous variables and the macro
economic parameters considered in the case study are
given below :
Use of simulation in capital budgeting dates back to
the well known work of Hertz (1964) which has now
evolved into a methodology in project appraisal
(Prasanna, 1995). But since the pricing of output of
IPPs is unique so as to get an assured return to the
IPPs, the resultant cash flows are different from typical
project net cash-inflows as described in relevant
literature (Prasanna, 1995).
Project statistics
Capacity of the project
Cost per MW
Total Cost of the project
Debt -Equity
Equity
Simulation
250MW
Rs. 4.00 crores
Rs. 1000 crores
4: 1
Rs. 200.00 crores
The promoter brings in equity, raises debt, builds the
facility, generates and sells power and repays the debt
along with interest. The tariff for the power is so fixed
that the promoter is assured a minimum rate of return
of 16% return if he a~hieves 68.5°,lc> PLF. On equity of
Rs. 200 crores, the promoters earn a return as above
after bringing in the debt required and also repaying the
same. Hence, the initial cash flow for this project is
Rs. 200 crores from the promoter's point of view, even
though the total fund invested is Rs.1000 crores
(Prasanna,1995).
Simulation Process
In this exercise, PLF, construction period and incentive
are exogenous variables. The probability distribution of
these variables are described in Appendix 1. The
discount factor, the power purchase agreement (PPA)
validity period are other parameters. The discount factor
has been taken at 14% and the PPA validity period as
25 years (see Box 3,4 and 5 for details).
As described already,
RoR =16% + (PLF-68.5)*incentive factor
Using random numbers, one set each for PLF
construction period and incentive, we obtain the random
variates of the corresponding three probabilistic
variables PLF, construction period and incentive. Then
we compute cash flows as RoR (in %) * Rs. 200 crores.
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With this, we compute NPV for each simulation run using
a program specifically designed in C++. We simulated
an experience of 10000 runs.
Using the results of the simulation analysis the risk
profiles for the net present value and the associated
arithmetic mean, standard deviation and co-efficient of
variation are computed. They are as follows:
The risk profile for net present value has been presented
in the form of a probability distribution (see Figure 1). At
any point of time, the NPV has not gone below zero.
With range of values, it could be seen that with the.present
policy prevailing an average NPV of Rs. 38.64 crores
can be obtained. In view of this, the IPPs are well placed
as they can recover their investment provided the
assumption that has been made and the current policy
guidelines are implemented in letter and spirit.
Mean net present value (Rs in crores)
Standard deviation
Co-efficient of variation (%)
Managerial implication of simulation
38.64
7.40
19.16
2. Only one factor is varied at a time in order to
understand the relationship and the effect of that
particular factor on NPV.
3. The following inputs are taken for the purpose of
arriving at the rate of return.
a. Plant load factor is 85%, which is the mean PLF
achieved by IPPs as per the survey.
b. Incentive factor of 0.6% for every increase of
1% PLF, which is the mean incentive achieved
bylPPs as per survey.
4. Cash inflows and outflows are discounted @ 14°16
unless specified otherwise.
5. Cash flows are arrived at for a period of 25 years
unless specified otherwise.
We shall now see the critical factor (i.e., discount
factor), which has a high impact on the returns, thereby
facilitating the project owners to focus on this critical
factor.
Discount factor/Opportunit~cost
Effect of inflation on NPV: According to Fischer's
formula, nominal interest rate equals real interest rate
plus inflation. (Prasanna, 1997).
From Table 1, it is clear that a project having a discount
factor as high as 16% can still be viable. In the scenario
of falling interest rates, the investment proposal looks
very attractive.
A range of discount factors from 9% to 180/0 is used to
discount the cash in-flows. The effect of the same on
the NPV is given in Table 1.
A nominal discount rate of 14% is inclusive of inflation.
If the rate of inflation averages to 5%, it means the real
discount rate is 9%. Thus in the above case, we have
considered inflation from nil to 9%, the real discount
rate being 9%. If the inflation is nil, the project earns
an NPV of Rs. 168.34 crores. When the inflation goes
upto 7%, making the nominal discount rate equal to
Table 1 : Effect of Discount Factor on the NPV of a Project at Different Discount Rates
Procedure for sensitivity analysis:
1. Method for computation of cash flows is same as
the one used in simulation exercise.
Sensitivity Analysis
The case study described above addresses the issue
of project viability. It does not discuss as to what would
happen, if some of the inputs, where at present,
guarantees are given, were to change. Whether or not
one is armed with the probabilistic data, one of the first
actions in such a scenario is to identify the critical
.variables, which one is handling. This process involves
removal of the insignificant to leave the critical factors
more clearly visible. Valuable insights can therefore be
obtained by sensitivity analysis applied to the above
model. This analysis thus, gives the sensitiveness of
the NPV to the different parameters.
--- ---------~
Rates 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
NPV 168.4 132.72 102.11 75.72 52.87 33.02 15.73 03.62 (12.63) (24.27)
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Table 2 : Effect of Discount Factor on the NPV of a Project When the Initial Investment is Brought in Two
Equal Instalments
Rates 9
NPV 175.91
10 11
140.98 111.04
12
85.28
13
63.05
14
43.80
15
27.07
16
..12.51
17
(0.21 )
18
(11.35)
16% the project earns a positive NPV. If the inflation
goes above 70/0, the NPV becomes negative and the
project becomes unviable.
When equity is brought in two equal annual
installments:
In the above case we presumed that the initial
investment of Rs. 200.00 crores is made in year one in
one shot itself. If the promoter brings this initial
investment in two equal annual installments in year I
and 2, then would it have any impact on his return and
viability of the project?
A comparison of Tables 1 and 2 shows that the NPV of
the project will be higher at different discount rates when
equity is brought in two equal annual installments.
Hence, the promoter should try and arrange to get
equity outlay in installments, thereby maximizing
the return. It would be ideal if initial funds are tied up
through debt.
Construction period
Though the survey findings say that the project takes
36 months to be brought into operations, what happens
if the said project can be completed early or gets
delayed. Table 3 shows the effect of project completion
on NPV.
Table 3 : Effect on NPV and IRR When the
Construction Period is Varied
Years 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
. NPV 63.69 48.36 33.02 19.57 6.121 (5.68)
IRR 18% 17% 16% 15% 14% 14%
It would also be interesting to note that if the initial
investment were brought in two equal installments in
year 0 and year I, the outcome would be as presented
in Table 4.
Table 4 : Effect on NPV and IRR When the
Construction Period is Varied and the Intial
Investment is Made in Two Equallnstallement
Years 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
NPV 74.47 59.13 43.80 30.34 16.89 5.09
IRR 19°k 18% 17% 16°k 150/0 14%
PPA validity period
The results of the survey indicate that most of the PPAs
entered into or proposed to be entered into are for a
period of 25 years. What would happen if the PPA
validity period were increased by another 5 years or
reduced by 5 years? The effect of extension and
reduction in the PPA period can be seen in Table 5.
Table 5 : Effect on NPV and IRR When the
Validity of PPA is Varied
Years 20 25 30
NPV 23.21 33.02 38.12
IRR 16% 16% 16%
Table 5 shows that if the PPA validity period comes
down to 20 years, it will bring down the project NPV by
Rs. 9.81 crores and the IRR does not follow the same
trend. Also if the period goes up to 30 years, the project
NPV does not go up proportionately besides there is
no change in the IRR.
Rate of return at higher plant load factor
As per 1996 policy, the government had fixed the rate
of return on the capital invested @ 16% at 68.5 plant
load factor (PLF). Thereafter, for every 1% increase in
the PLF, the incentive factor up to maximum amount of
0.7 % is allowed to be given. This rate of return is fixed
based on the performance of public sector power units,
which is poorly maintained. However, with high plant
load factor achieved by couple of independent power
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Table 6 : Effect on NPV at Different Discount Rates When the Rate of
Return is Fixed at 75 PLF Instead of 68.5 PLF
Rates 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
NPV ~ 16.16
L--.. __.- --
85.98 60.10 37.82 18.57 1.88 (12.63) (25.28) (36.34) (46.04)
projects and lot of public outrage regarding the higher
rate of return being given to independent power
producers, the government is rethinking of fixing the
return at higher PLF.
Table 6 gives the effect on the NPV at different discount
rates when the rate of return of 16% is fixed at 75 PLF
instead of 68.5 PLF.
Let us take that the government does not change the
normative PLF, but changes the rate of return itself.
Following table would give the effect of NPV and IRR
when the rate of return is reduced at a normative PLF
level of 68.5% level. The outcome is given in Table 7.
Table 7 : Effect on NPV and IRR When the Rate of
Return is Reduced at Normative PLF Level of 68.5%
Residual value
At the end of the PPA validity period, the power plant
is either handed over to SEB or the power producer is
allowed to continue to use, but with lot of stringent
clauses. In the model we have assumed that the power
plant is handed over to the SEBs at the end of the PPA
validity. l.n such a scenario, the residual value can be
anywhere between 5-10% of the total project cost itself.
Thus, it would be interesting to see, how the NPV and
IRR would behave for a situation where in the plant has
a 10% residual value at the end of the 25th year.
However, experts are of the opinion that there should
not be any terminal payment at the end of the PPA
validity as consumers in the form of demand charges
have paid the cost of the plant.
An important observation here is that the NPV does
not vary much when the rate of return is reduced at
normative level as compared with the case when the.
assured rate of return is 16% at a higher PLF (Le., 75%
instead of 68.50/0 PLF). This gives a tool for power
producers to present their case asking the government
to consider the option of lower rate at 68.5% PLF as
compared to 16% return at higher PLF.
Rates
NPV
IRR
14%
17.05
15%
15%
25.04
However, the question is to what extent these issues
are significant. Tables 8 and 9 give the effect on NPV
and IRR at different discounting rates reckoning residual
value of 10 % of the total project cost and the other one
without considering the same.
Looking at the two tables, it may be observed that the
residual value in principle does not add much value to
facilitate the decision making process.
Thus, it can be seen from the above that sensitivity
analysis goes a long way in identifying the key elements,
which may lead to a particular outcome. This in turn
Table 8 : Effect on NPV When there is no Residual Value at the End of 25th year
17 18
(13.47) (24.95)
16
(0.44)
15
14.41
14
31.37
13
50.78
12
73.09
Rates 9 10 11
--------.----------------------------------------------1
NPV 163.02 128.52 98.79
18
(23.60)
17
(11.79)
16
1.67
15
17.05
14
34.68
13
54.95
12
78.34
11
105.43
10
Table 9 : Effect on NPV When there is a Residual Value of 10% of the Project Cost at the End of 25th year
[Rates _9 ~
NPV 173.66 136.91
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would provide an opportunity to the investor to strive for
or avoid certain elements/situations. Combined with the
simulation, sensitivity gives altogether a new dimension
in the process of decision-making and the major
infrastructure project decisions are no exception to this.
t
Limitations of the study
• Study is based on the thermal power projects.
• Study is time bound and due to changes taking place
in the government policies, the results may not be
sustained over a period of time.
• It is assumed that all the agreements entered into
with different agencies will be honoured.
Findings and conclusions
• The return earned by an IPP depends on
construction period, PLF and incentive rate.
• For a PPA validity period of 25 years and a discount
rate of 14%, an IPP is financially viable, an.d earns
a NPV of Rs. 38.64 crores for an equity investment
of Rs. 200.00 crores.
• At a mean PLF of 85%, a mean incentive of 0.6% and
a mean construction period of 3 years, the project is
viable even if the discount rate goes upto 160/0. If the
discount rate comes down to 9% , the IPP can earn a
NPV of Rs. 168.34 crores.
• Bringingthe equity in two equal installmentsenhances
the earningcapacityof an IPP.When equity is brought
in two equal installmems, the NPV goes upto Rs.
43.80 crores at a discount rate of 14% • Hence, it is
advisable to fund the initial commitment of the
project through debt.
• Also, if the promoters are able to complete
construction in 2 years, the IPP will be able to earn
an NPV of Rs. 63.69 crores.
In the light of the above, IPPs are not only financially
viable, but also an attractive investment opportunity.
Usefulness of the work
This analysis will be useful to promoters planning to
enter the power generation industry. Further, it will also
be useful as an exercise in the valuation of an IPP
when mergers and acquisitions take place. It is useful
to policy makers in designing appropriate pricing policies
and also to developmental financial institutions in their
lending decisions.
Future areas of work
Project appraisal technique presented in this paper can
be replicated in other infrastructure sector like telecom,
shipping, railways, etc to assess the economic viability
of an investment by a private entrepreneur.
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APPENDIX-1
Probability
0.33
0.33
0.34
Probability
0.08
0.11
0.19
0.23
0.21
0.11
0.07
0.5
0.6
0.7
78-80
80-82
82-84
84-86
86-88
88-90
90-92
Probability Distributions for Incentive Factor
Incentive
Following data is based on the response obtained by 3 existing licencees, I operationallPP and
the rest from IPPs, which are still to get financial closure. Hence, in some cases, the responses
are projections of variables, which the IPPs hope to achieve.
Probability distribution for Construction Period variable
Period Probability
Less than 36 months 0.05
36 months 0.90
More than 36 months 0.05
Probability Distributions for Plant Load factor
Plant Load Factor
Probability Distribution of NPV
0.35 ---.--------------------------,
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
o 2.5 7.5 12.5 17.5 22.5 27.5 32.5 37.5 42.5 47.5 52.5 57.5 62.5
Figure 1 : Probability Distribution of NPV
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Box 1: Background of the study and important features of Government Power Policy 1996
Government of India in order to facilitate private participation opened up the power generation
industry. The salient features of the policy are:
* Constitution of Electricity regulatory commissions at state and central level.
* Rationalization of tariff.
* Private sector participation in distribution sector.
* Autonomy to State Electricity Boards (SEB).
* Changing the mode of functioning of SEBs.
* Private sector can set up power projects of any size and type.
* To ensure that private participation brings in additional resources to the sector, not less than
60% of the total outlay for the project should come from sources other than Indian public
financial institutions.
* Upto 100% foreign equity participation is permitted for IPPs.
* Tax holiday in respect of 100% of the taxable profits in the first five years and 30% taxable
profits in the following five years.
* 16% rate of return on equity has been provided, taxes on which would be reckoned as part of
demand charges.
* The tariff is based on two-part tariff one to cover the fixed expenses and the other to cover the
variable expenses at a prescribed level of performance.
Box 2 : Tools for investment decision-making used in this study
Net Present Value: Net present value is the present value of future cash inflows earned by a
project, less initial cash outlay using an appropriate discount rate. "The decision criteria to accept
the project depend on whether the net present value is positive or negative".
Monte-Carlo Simulation: It is a method of solving complex probabilistic problems by a process of
controlled random sampling.
Box 3 : Steps in Simulation (Chandra, Prasaima (1998) pp 288)
1. Identify the criterion variable, exogenous variables (variables which are probabilistic in
nature and are outside the control of the decision maker) and parameters (inputs specified by
the decision maker and held constant over all the simulation runs).
2. Model of the project - A model expresses the criterion variable in terms of exogenous
variables and parameters.
3. Specify the values of parameters and probability distribution of exogenous variables.
4. Generate random numbers, one each for each of the exogenous variables, determine the
corresponding variates of exogenous variables and find the criterion variable.
5. Risk profile: Repeat steps 3 and 4 a large number of times and plot the frequency distribution
of the criterion variable, which is called the risk profile.
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Box 4 : Variables used in the study
Construction period - The period that is required to set up an infrastructural facility with all the
approvals depends on the type of the project. Government policy gives an indicative construction
period of 36 months. The probability distribution for the construction period is given in the
appendix.
Plant Load Factor (PLF) - Plant Load factor forms the key for generating the returns on the
investment made in the power project. PLF here refers to the total time for which the plant is in
operation in a given year generating the power. Based on the empirical analysis of the entire state
owned power-generating units, the Government has fixed the rate of return on plant load factor.
Considering the public sector performance and the keenness on the part of the government to
enhance the private enterprise participation in this sector, the rate of return has been fixed at a
normative level of 68.5°10 plant load factor. However, this achievement of plant load factor is
dependent on the respective state electricity boards asking the power generators to generate the
power. Under power purchase agreement, the state electricity boards have obligation to lift power
which-will make the private enterprise developed power project to engage itself and achieve
68.5°10 plant load factor. Beyond this, it is at the sole discretion of..the state electricity boards to
ask to generate additional power. Hence, an uncertainty has been introduced at this point and the
power developer has to get an estimate of the net plant load factor he would achieve, which is not
a very simple task at hand. The probability distribution, derived as result of survey is given in
appendix 1.
Incentive - when an independent power producer achieves a plant load factor of more than 68.50/0,
the question is how to determine the return on the additional plant load factor beyond 68.50/0.
Based on the empirical study of the public sector units by CEA, the same has been fixed
between 0.1% to 0.7°/0 for every 1% increase in plant load factor. This incentive factor is also to
be decided by the state electricity board and the same is decided based on the plant load factor
achieved and other considerations. Hence, the determination of incentive is also uncertain. The
probability distribution, derived as result of survey is given in appendix I.
Discount rate - Discount rate is a measure of the minimum expected rate of return the promoters
would like to get from the project. The discount rate is generally influenced by the cost of capital,
both debt and equity, for the promoter.
Considering the Indian scenario, where interest rate is going down and the policy makers decision
to relate the interest rate to the prevailing international interest rate, the authors after obtaining
data from the experts on the said macro economic indicator, have taken the discounting factor of
14°/0, which is based on the LIBOR and reckoned with the country risk and the project risk.
Rate of return - The Government has allowed a 16°/0 rate of return on equity. For the portion of
foreign equity, the return upto 16°/0 can be designated in the currency of the subscribed capital to
protect it from the foreign exchange fluctuations. The expert opinion survey revealed that govern-
ment has considered the inflation rate taking into consideration the maturity that the economy is
expected to achieve while determining the rate of return of 16°/0 at base level of 68.5°10 of PLF.
Cash flows - For the purpose of this exercise, the cash inflows are taken based on the return on
equity throughout the project life. This is because of the uniqueness of the power project, where
in, all the fixed costs like interest, depreciation, taxes on income, etc are recovered as demand
contd .
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charges from the consumers. The annual cash flow is dependent on the PLF achieved and the
incentive that is allowed for excess PLF achieved over and above 68.50/0. Multiplying the rate of
return with the equity investment made in the project gives the annual cash flow.
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) - An agreement entered into between the IPP and the power
purchaser for the purchase of power from the IPP. PPA is usually entered into for a period of 25
years.
Debt-Equity ratio - The promoter subject to the limiting value of the debt-equity ratio can regulate
incurring of debt during constructionperlod. Usually the equity is used up in the initial years of
project construction activity and debt is availed to cover the expenses later. In power projects,
the government has allowed the debt-equity ratio of 4:1 , which has been taken as a norm for the
current study. The interest on the debt is a pass through and the same comes as demand charges,
which is recovered from the consumers of electricity.
Residual Value: Is the terminal payment that is received by an IPP for transferring the generating
unit to an entity as per the provisions of the agreement. In the current study, it is taken at 5% of
the total project cost based on the inputs of "thefield study.
Box 5: Assumptions for the risk analysis
a The return is on the equity invested, which is assumed to remain constant throughout the
project life.
b The demand for power exceeds supply for the next 25 years as per the projections made by
Central Electricity Authority and other agencies.
c. The simulation exercise is based on the inputs obtained from the survey and the policy
parameters of Government of India's power policy as announced in the year 1996.
d. The risks that are expected from shortage in fuel supply are adequately covered in terms of
ensuring adequate supply commitment from the fuel supplying company by entering into Fuel
Supply Agreement. Similarly, water supply for thermal power plants is ensured by water supply
agreement, with the state irrigation department. Further, to manage the cost on account of
non - supply of water and fuel, appropriate provisions in power purchase agreement are
incorporated.
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